Ein Putsch der Revolutionsgardisten im Iran?

Seit einiger Zeit wird im Iran immer öfter die Frage gestellt, ob angesichts der innen- und außenpolitischen Krisen, in denen sich die islamische Republik befindet, ein drohender Putsch der Revolutionsgardisten möglich sei.

Saeid Golkar diskutiert mögliche Szenarien:

Any serious reform of the system could undermine the supreme leader's position of power. Since Ayatollah Khamenei was selected as the new supreme leader in 1989, he has had sporadically tumultuous relationships with all the presidents who have served during his tenure, regardless of their ideological leanings. He has shown a deep desire to monopolise power and maintain the status quo. It is a common belief among Iranian observers that as long as Ayatollah Khamenei is in the power, change is unlikely.  

At the same time, the political capital Iranian President Hassan Rouhani used to enjoy with the supreme leader has seriously declined. Back in 2013, Ayatollah Khamenei found Rouhani an acceptable candidate for the presidential post because he needed a moderate political figure to reach an agreement with the West over Iran's nuclear programme and have the sanctions dropped.

But the escalating political hostility coming out of Washington is hurting the Iranian government, which risks losing its credibility if the US exits the nuclear deal and imposes a new round of sanctions on Iran. Also, Rouhani has gradually become unpopular among Iranians who have lost hope for the possibility of meaningful changes. His new liberal economic policies have already hurt the Iranian poor and lower middle classes. 

If the situation gets worse and the stability of the clerical regime is endangered, Ayatollah Khamenei has the power to overthrow Rouhani's administration. Hardliners in the Iranian regime believe that self-reliance and resistance against the hegemonic powers of the West can solve Iran's problems. Ayatollah Khamenei could decide that the best plan of action at this time is to remove moderates from power and install hardliners. (...)

Ayatollah Khamenei is strengthening his political grip over the Iranian military so if the time comes for action to be taken, he has the complete obedience of the officer corps.

He seems to be getting the IRGC ready for one of two scenarios: one, in the short term, if the crisis gets worse, the Guard would overthrow Rouhani's administration; two, if the situation stabilises, Rouhani will be allowed to finish his term and thereafter the IRGC would install a military president.

At the same time, over the past few months, a number of outspoken hardliners have started talking about how having a military president could resolve Iran's domestic and regional problems. Some have gone as far as suggesting Qassem Suleimani for the position, as well as other IRGC leaders. In 2016, Suleimani rejected suggestions that he would run in the presidential vote of that year; this year, however, polls show he is more popular than Rouhani. 

These discussions of the possibility of a "military president" may aim not only to gauge public opinions towards this idea but perhaps also break its taboo among Iranians. 

While it is impossible to predict Ayatollah Khamenei's decisions, it is quite likely that in the coming months the crisis in Iran will deepen due to both international and domestic factors, which could prompt the supreme leader to take action against the government.