Über Ursachen der anhaltenden Proteste im Südirak

Eine ausführliche und lesenswerte Analyse von Matthew Schweitzer:

Public anger and instability has been brewing in southern Iraq since late 2017, when Basrawis demonstrated against insufficient electricity supplies, poor water quality, and controversial plans to reform the electric-sector’s fee structure. Over the past year there have been more than 260 separate protests, often expressing highly-local demands such as wage increases, infrastructure development, or improved water and service provision. More recently, between November 2017 and April 2018, southern Iraq averaged 12 to 14 significant (comprising more than 150 individuals) protests per month, with large-scale electricity-related demonstrations concentrated around Nasiriyah, Basra, Samawah, and Rumaitha. By June, the region experienced at least one protest each day, focusing on clean water, employment, infrastructure development, and sufficient electricity.

Growing slums have also provided militia and criminal organizations with a reliable and growing recruitment source.

Current protests amplified these grievances. Some analysts have speculatedthat Iran seeks to leverage demonstrations to disrupt Iraqi oil export, while others blame political actors like Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr—who emerged with the greatest share of votes in May’s parliamentary elections—for fomenting instability. These explanations, however, do not adequately explain how southern Iraq reached this crisis-point. A case in point is Basra, where demonstrations originated. The region encapsulates much of the anger felt by southern Iraqis, as well as the sources of instability driving July’s demonstrations: 15 years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, it remains without sufficient electricity, water, healthcare, educational, or other basic services despite vast oil wealth.

The Iraqi government, of course, cannot afford long-term instability in the south. Basra’s oilfields and Persian Gulf export terminal account for approximately 95 percent of the country’s GDP and its only sea-access. The region sent tens of thousands of young men to fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), many of whom are now returning home with their weapons. Yet, many Iraqi political leaders took southern Iraq’s relative stability for granted, ignoring steadily growing political volatility, economic malaise, and deep public anger against both provincial and national politicians. During the May 2018 parliamentary elections, only 14.4 percent of Basra’s eligible voters went to the polls (compared to a still-dismal 44.5 percent nationally), a figure that underscored the region’s sense of dislocation from Baghdad and ongoing desires among the population for increased autonomy from the federal government.

Southern Iraq’s Economic Seesaw

Given its location and natural resource wealth, Basra could be Iraq’s wealthiest and most secure province. It has remained relatively immune from ISIS activity and is home to the country’s only ports and most productive oilfields. High oil prices between 2010 and 2014 fueled a period of rapid development that seemed to presage a stable future. By 2013, Basra city boasted new restaurants, movie theaters, and shopping malls visited by families looking to spend newly-acquired income from oil-sector jobs. In January 2014, the price of a typical 1,200 square-foot property in central Basra reached $1 million, while rent averaged $2,000 per month. Rapid socioeconomic transformations pushed many poorer residents to rapidly-growing slums on the city’s under-developed outskirts. (...)

Water quality also exacerbates other regional issues, including insufficient power generation. For example, electrical power plants and oil refineries that require a steady supply of fresh water to spin their turbines curtailed operations from July 5-7 after the Shatt al-Arab’s salt content exceeded operable levels—further exacerbating power outages across the region and inciting grievances against Baghdad and provincial authorities.

Growing slums have also provided militia and criminal organizations with a reliable and growing recruitment source. Since 2014, many armed groups operating inside Basra and surrounding areas merged with the Popular Mobilization organization, a move that afforded legal cover, additional weapons, and new funding streams. As militias consolidated gains after 2014, stability in Basra deteriorated. Late that year, the Iraqi Army’s 14

th Division and a Federal Police Battalion responsible for security in Basra redeployed to defend Baghdad from ISIS, leaving only nine incomplete police battalions and an under-strength army battalion to secure the province of approximately 4.7 million people. The security vacuum resulted in a dramatic increase of armed robberies, resurgent tribal clashes, and organized crime (such as drug trafficking).

Insecurity has worsened as thousands of Basrawi PMU fighters return home from the battlefield against ISIS. These veterans overwhelm Basra’s ailing public health system; in an effort to expand the number of post-surgical beds, for example, the Health Ministry repurposed one of Saddam Hussein’s decrepit former palaces into a prosthesis and physiotherapy clinic. The majority of these returnees rely on government pensions and social security payouts that Baghdad can increasingly ill-afford.